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We are going into the general elections next year, and before this we expect to 
implement many reforms. It is our view at the 
Electoral Commission that we are preparing for 
a national election that in many aspects will be 
different from previous national elections. 
Background 
We have had six general elections since the 
first one was held in 1977. The last election 
in 2002 was described as the worst election 
ever held in Papua New Guinea; it saw the 
Electoral Commission declaring results in six 
electorates failed. Supplementary elections 
were consequently held in 2003. 
Administering elections in Papua New 
Guinea is not an easy task. It is tedious, 
difficult, expensive and often risky. The 
history of the conduct of elections since 
1977 has not been positive. One would have 
expected an improvement in the conduct and 
administration of elections but I must say we 
have not improved. 
The quality and competency of the elections 
has continued to decline as the country 
progressed. There are many factors involved, 
but a major factor, I believe, is the rapid socio-
economic and political development we have 
gone through, and the decline in the respect 
for government processes and authority by our 
people. Inadequate and late release of funds 
for general elections has also, in my view, 
contributed to this situation. 
Despite all these difficulties, the Electoral 
Commission performed to expectation 
and declared results that have placed our 
representatives in the National Parliament. 
We have learnt lessons and have attempted 
to rectify some of the problems we have 
continued to experience since 1977. 
Many reviews have been done of elections 
in Papua New Guinea, including reviews by 
the National Research Institute (formerly 
IASER). These reviews have reached common 
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conclusions that there are indeed irregularities 
in the electoral process in Papua New Guinea. 
The most recent review, entitled Election 
Lessons, by the Institute of National Affairs in 
collaboration with Transparency International 
and the Institute of Policy Studies based at 
New Zealand’s Victoria University, stated 
boldly that some of these irregularities threaten 
the very nature of democracy in Papua New 
Guinea. 
The electoral roll 
The most outstanding problem, repeatedly 
cited, is the electoral roll or common roll. It is 
widely known that Papua New Guinea has a 
hugely inflated electoral roll, and although this 
has sometimes been a topic for amusing stories, 
it is a serious matter. 
In February 2006, for the first time in the 
history of the Electoral Commission, I revealed 
details of how bad our electoral roll is. A review 
by the Electoral Commission found that the 
entire roll is inflated and corrupt. 
The review estimated the number of eligible 
voters for the 2002 elections at 2.7 million; 
however, the number of voters on the electoral 
roll was 4.9 million. This figure cannot be 
correct, given that our population is about 
5.1 million. It indicates that about half of the 
names on the rolls were suspect, consequently 
bringing into question the legitimacy of 
representation in parliament. 
We simply cannot allow this situation to 
remain unchecked. It is a major irregularity 
that must be fixed, as it seriously undermines 
the credibility of our elections, and therefore 
democracy at large. On this matter, I have 
announced that the electoral roll used in the 
2002 elections will be discarded. 
The 2002 roll has been updated since 
1977. It simply cannot be used again. The 
Commission has begun the process of creating 
a completely new electoral roll for Papua New 
Guinea. It is a challenge, but we must do this 
to safeguard our election process. 
There are numerous reasons why we have 
this overly inflated roll. One of these is the law 
itself. Various provisions of the Organic Law on 
Elections make it difficult to clean the roll by 
removing names – for example the names of 
deceased people or names that occur twice. To 
remove names from the roll one must formally 
object and there is a court process involved 
where people are dissatisfied. The process is 
thus a long and tedious one. The result is that 
ghost names have remained and abuses have 
occurred. 
The Electoral Commission has admitted 
that electoral rolls are defective and is doing its 
part to create new electoral rolls. However, at 
the end of the day, the people of Papua New 
Guinea must take ownership of the electoral 
roll. The people of Papua New Guinea must 
assist the Electoral Commission in preparing 
clean and accurate rolls and not take measures 
aimed at corrupting the rolls by coming forward 
with false names and seeking to influence 
electoral officials to include the names of non-
existent persons. 
The electoral roll reforms are significant, 
but are only one part of an overhaul of our 
electoral law, policy and processes. 
The limited preferential voting 
system 
Another major change in the electoral 
process relates to the manner in which voters 
will cast their votes. 
General elections in Papua New Guinea 
are amongst the most colourful, vibrant and 
energized events in the lives of our people. 
Justifiably, it is a time for people to be excited 
to elect their political leaders. However, 
general elections, in some parts of the country, 
have turned into times of conflict, violence 
and disruption. 
People vote for their representatives in 
parliament largely on the basis of ethnic or 
tribal support, while some candidates are used 
to split votes. Over time, more candidates have 
joined in the race, resulting in a reduction in 
the number of voters voting for the winning 
candidate, with the consequence that the 
mandate of members of parliament decreased. 
The decision to move from the first-past-the-
post voting system to the limited preferential 
voting (LPV) system is an attempt to meet these 
problems and also, more importantly, to ensure 
that the people’s representatives in parliament 
are decided upon by majority support. 
A review of results has shown that a great 
majority of the elected members have scored 
less than 20 per cent of votes since 1997 and 
in 2002 less then 15 per cent of votes – that is, 
members were not obtaining a majority vote. 
This has had an impact on the provision 
of development and services, as members of 
parliament have concentrated their efforts in 
taking goods and services to areas where they 
received most votes. 
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marking votes 1, 2 and 3, but must also know 
why they are voting 1, 2 and 3. They must have 
some understanding of the counting system. 
The creation of a new electoral roll and the 
introduction of a limited preferential system are 
two major reforms now being undertaken, but 
the Electoral Commission has recommended 
other reforms which we believe will con tribute 
to the better administration and conduct of 
elections. 
The National Executive Council has 
approved major reforms to the Organic Law on 
National and Local-level Government Elections, 
which have been gazetted and should be tabled 
in parliament in the April 2006 session, when 
the first vote will be taken. 
This set of reforms is the result of a review 
of the electoral law and the integrity of 
political parties and candidates legislation 
by the Electoral Commission assisted by the 
Australian Electoral Commission. It takes 
into account reports and recommendations 
of the Commonwealth Observer Mission that 
reviewed and reported on the 2002 general 
election. It also takes into account reports 
prepared by AusAID on the 2002 elections and 
observer reports by Transparency International 
and the Institute of National Affairs into by-
elections conducted after the 2002 elections. 
It also incorporates reports from election 
managers in the provinces. 
The reforms are huge – I could speak all day 
on individual aspects of changes we anticipate 
will come into effect by the 2007 elections 
– but I will attempt to highlight major aspects 
of the recommendations and their respective 
implications on the coming elections. 
election failures 
Political and electoral history was made 
in the 2002 elections, when the Electoral 
Commission failed six elections in the 
Southern Highlands Province, because threats 
of violence and actual violence disrupted the 
elections. 
The Electoral Commission, seeing potential 
problems in the future, has recommended 
the establishment of an Election Advisory 
Committee. This Committee will comprise 
the chief ombudsman or his nominee, and two 
other persons, one nominated by the board of 
Transparency International and one a retired 
judge, or lawyer qualified to be appointed a 
judge, nominated by the electoral commissioner 
in consultation with the chief ombudsman and 
The new form of LPV voting, we hope, 
will change the mindset of our people and of 
our members of parliament so that we see can 
a trouble-free, transparent and cooperative 
election. 
In this new system, candidates must 
work together and make sure they are true 
representatives of the people in their respective 
electorates. By this, we should be able to see 
a gradual improvement in the provision of 
services, a decline in violence, and some 
transparency in the manner candidates go out 
and campaign and the way people vote. 
We have used the LPV system in a number 
of by-elections held after 2002 and indications 
are that people are aware of the use of LPV. 
However, there is still a need for people to fully 
understand that they must put preferences 1,2, 
3 and not ticks or Xs, and to understand the 
counting system so that they can appreciate 
what giving preferences 1, 2 and 3 to particular 
candidates means. 
The use of LPV in the general election 
of 2007 is likely to see changes to the way 
elections are conducted. The Electoral 
Commission hopes, in particular, to see the 
following changes: 
•	 candidates and political parties displaying 
cooperative behaviour, as this is the only 
winning strategy; 
• supporters of candidates following suit and 
behaving accordingly, thus reducing tension 
between tribal and ethnic groups, allowing 
elections to be conducted peacefully; 
• bribery or corruption at elections reduced, as 
it is now not possible (as it was under first- 
past-the-post) for candidates to buy their 
way into parliament, because LPV makes it 
almost impossible to win by bribery alone; 
• voters having a wider choice – with the 
three preferences more voters now have the 
ability to vote for a winning candidate; and 
• women voters especially now have a chance 
to vote freely according to their own wishes 
as they have three preferences to give, as 
opposed to the single vote under first-past-
the- post when most womenfolk in the 
country may have been required by clans, 
tribes and husbands to vote according 
to choices not made by the women 
themselves. 
The challenges that LPV poses are real. 
Voting may take longer. Counting may take 
longer. Voters must be educated not only on 
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Transparency International. The primary role of 
this committee is to provide recommendations 
and advice to the Electoral Commission on 
matters concerning the law on elections and 
other matters relating to elections referred by 
the Electoral Commission. 
A decision to declare an election as failed 
will only be made by the electoral commissioner 
on the recommendation of this committee. 
The electoral commission wants this process to 
be as transparent as possible so that powers to 
fail an election are not abused. 
Prosecution – illegal practices
Experience of violence, threats and 
intimidation has been the norm in elections 
in Papua New Guinea. These illegal practices 
have not been spelled out clearly as electoral 
offences and the proposed law is to include 
them. 
The reforms proposed give powers to the 
Electoral Commission to prosecute people 
involved in such practices such as violence 
intended to interfere with the conduct of 
elections, assault and threats to electoral 
officers, inciting or encouraging disturbances to 
interfere with elections, and similar offences. 
An important aspect of this law is that 
persons convicted will be disqualified from 
voting, holding elective public office, or being 
employed in the public service, provincial 
government or local-level government. 
The law is intended to restrict violence and 
threats of violence so that voters are allowed 
to exercise their democratic rights freely and 
without duress, and that elections are seen to 
be credible and trouble free. 
Voter identification system 
In view of the experiences of double 
voting and ghost names on the electoral roll, 
the Electoral Commission proposes a voter 
identification system to be used in the future. 
This system may use manual finger prints, 
computer-recorded and recognized finger or 
palm prints, electronic or other photographic 
systems, or some combination of these. 
This proposal will be implemented at an 
appropriate time if funding and appropriate 
technology are available. We have begun 
discussions with the Birth Registry Section 
of the Department of Social Development on 
how we can work together using an integrated 
network. 
Date of return of writ 
The proposed law has given the Electoral 
Commission some flexibility with respect 
to the period within which a writ should be 
returned. Given past experience, when we were 
sometimes rushed to conduct elections because 
of the strict timeframe imposed by law, the new 
law proposes that where special circumstances 
exist the Commission may, by notice in the 
National Gazette, extend the period of polling, 
and may also fix different polling dates for 
different electorates. 
The current law states that polling will 
commence on the same date for all electorates 
and that the writs be returnable twenty-one 
days after the end of polling. 
Where problems prevent the Commission 
from conducting polling in a particular area, for 
example because of natural causes such as bad 
weather conditions, the Electoral Commission 
must have the flexibility to reschedule polling. 
invitation to form government 
There has been considerable discussion 
in this area, given the sensitivity of the issue 
and the politics involved in the formation of 
government. Discussions have centred on 
when the formation of government should take 
place. 
When the Organic Law On the Integrity 
of Political Parties and Candidates came into 
effect after the last general elections, the 
question came up of when was the correct 
time to advise the governor general to invite 
the winning party to form government. There 
was concern that while counting was ongoing 
in some electorates, the Electoral Commission 
could advise the governor general to invite the 
winning party to form government. 
While this did not create much of a 
problem in the 2002 election, because the 
number of winning candidates clearly favoured 
the National Alliance party, the Commission 
must have in place procedures to deal with 
situations where the winning candidate’s 
margin is narrow. 
The recommendation is that the Electoral 
Commission compute the number of candidates 
returned for each political party forty-eight 
hours to midnight of the day of the fifth 
anniversary of the parliament. The Electoral 
Commission, after making sure all matters are 
correct, will give the name of the political 
party or political parties to the head of state, 
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who will invite it or them to form government. 
The Electoral Commission’s advice to the head 
of state will be transparent. 
concluding remarks 
The implications of the proposed reforms 
for the 2007 elections and elections thereafter 
are huge. The reforms we have recommended 
represent a wholesale change to the processes 
we have followed since the first post-
independence elections in 1977. For the first 
time in the electoral history of Papua New 
Guinea, we at the Electoral Commission are 
taking a new approach to the planning and 
conduct of elections. 
The planning is a ‘whole of government’ 
approach so that there is the necessary adequate 
and immediate logistic, funding and resource 
support to the Electoral Commission. 
Past experience was based on the premise 
that election planning and conduct is the 
responsibility of the Electoral Commission. 
Security was for police, and the Electoral 
Commission dictated how the election was 
run. 
We want to change that. The establishment 
of an Inter-Departmental Electoral Committee 
(IDEC) is crucial to proper early planning. It 
is the strategic link to the Electoral Support 
Program board, made up of the Chief 
Secretary’s Office, IDEC, civil society, and 
donor agencies. 
A review by the Electoral Commission found 
that the causes of electoral problems, apart 
from the violence and threats, were far greater 
than simply the management, resources and 
administration of the Electoral Commission, 
but extended across the administrative 
capabilities of the state as a whole when it 
came to planning for elections. 
It is my firm view that the approach we 
are now taking will not immediately clean up 
and make perfect the electoral processes, but 
it is the beginning of what I believe will be a 
fair and transparent planning and conduct of 
elections which should have a simultaneous 
effect on the people, who will in turn respect 
the electoral processes. And as political parties 
become stronger, voters will begin to vote not 
on family and or clan lines but will put their 
mark according to the platforms and ideologies 
of a political party. 
Papua New Guinea will then have a truly 
democratically elected government. Political 
stability, and eventually a stable economy, 
will become the norm. This will surely have a 
positive effect on the lives of our people. 
Finally, let me make two appeals. 
First, I appeal to each and every member 
of parliament to pass the electoral reform 
legislative amendments now before parliament. 
The passage of this legislative package is crucial 
to the conduct of the general election in 2007. 
Secondly, I make a special appeal to every 
Papua New Guinean. The Papua New Guinea 
Electoral Commission can do its best to conduct 
your elections. It is preparing itself for it. 
However, the real success of elections remains 
in your hands. The elections are yours. It is your 
time to have a say in how Papua New Guinea 
progresses. This time does not come often; it 
comes once every five years. Make use of this 
opportunity. Assist the Electoral Commission 
to help you in exercising your voting power to 
return the right person to parliament to run this 
country. I appeal to every Papua New Guinean 
not to disrupt elections in any way, either by 
seeking to corrupt the enrolment process or 
through the polling process. 
Author note
Andrew S. Trawen, MBE is the Electoral 
Commissioner of Papua New Guinea.
endnotes
1  This paper was presented to a seminar at the National 
Research Institute on 23 March 2006.
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PAPeR Two
elecToRAl RefoRmS 
– imPRoViNg elecTioN 
ADmiNiSTRATioN AND 
mANAgemeNT1
]ohn nonggorr
This paper will briefly discuss proposed changes to the election laws to improve 
election administration and management in 
readiness for the general election in 2007. 
The impetus 
Why the reforms? There are two main 
reasons why changes are required to the laws 
governing elections: first, problems experienced 
in the general election of 2002 cannot be 
tackled, even with improved funding, election 
administration and management, without 
reviewing the laws governing elections; 
secondly, many aspects of the electoral process 
established by the current election laws are 
based on Australian practice from the 1970s. 
Some elements of these laws are no longer 
appropriate in Papua New Guinea because of 
the different local circumstances. 
The 2002 general election 
experience 
The general election of 2002 has been 
described as the worst election in Papua New 
Guinea’s short history. Three main problems 
were encountered. 
The first concerned the electoral roll. Many 
complaints were raised that the electoral roll 
was defective. Either eligible voters’ names 
were left off the roll, thus preventing many 
citizens from exercising their constitutionally 
guaranteed right to vote, or what have now 
come to be labelled ‘ghost names’ got on the 
roll, allowing people to cheat. 
There were two main reasons for the 
problems with the electoral roll. One was 
human failure: dishonesty has entered at 
many phases of the electoral roll updating and 
creating process. People deliberately make false 
claims for enrolment. Some enrolment officers 
deliberately facilitate false claims for enrolment, 
including suspect names in electoral rolls. The 
second was that the existing law has made it 
difficult for suspect names on electoral rolls to 
be removed. The proposed reforms address this 
(see below). 
Human failure by the many individuals 
involved in electoral roll updating and creation 
cannot be overcome simply by electoral law 
reform. Human behaviour, good or bad, must 
change through other means. Values and ethics 
take a long time to change, but incentives 
and disincentives may be used to bring about 
desired change more quickly. Legal measures 
may be employed to discourage dishonesty and 
fraudulent behaviour in electoral roll updating 
and preparation. Identifying, arresting and 
prosecuting those involved is the usual 
disincentive. However, this has not worked. 
Another disincentive against dishonest 
behaviour designed to corrupt the electoral 
roll is to make the populace understand that 
we all suffer as a result of such actions. There 
is a direct cost that affects us all, on an almost 
daily basis. Our children feel this too. A person 
whose election to parliament is enabled by 
cheating will not represent the electorate. 
MPs who do not have real voters to whom 
they must remain accountable for their future 
survival as MPs, and who know that they got 
elected through a corrupted system, will rely on 
the same corrupted process to be reelected. 
Accountability is the critical factor in 
democratic elections, and democracy in general. 
Individuals become MPs on the mandate of the 
voters. They are accountable to voters. If a MP 
does not remain accountable to voters, voters 
can withdraw the mandate in a subsequent 
election. Individuals elected through corrupt 
means, such as by getting people to corrupt 
electoral rolls, are unlikely to feel compelled to 
be accountable to voters. Moreover, those who 
cause others to corrupt the electoral process to 
get elected are intrinsically people with bad 
morals and ethics. Persons of such character 
will not have in mind the interests of voters. 
We all see the poor state of basic public 
services in Papua New Guinea at present. 
The great majority of our people in rural 
areas throughout the width and breadth of 
Papua New Guinea, as well as the majority 
lowly-paid or unemployed dwellers in urban 
areas, lack the most basic services – quality 
education and health services. Schools are 
not resourced, teachers are neglected and they 
neglect our children. With children denied 
a decent education, Papua New Guinea will 
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throughout the country. This is a brave action, 
not only in admitting that existing rolls are 
defective, but also in undertaking a task that 
is not simple. The task of creating new rolls 
s not entirely dependent on the Electoral 
Commission. The Electoral Commission 
does not have the manpower to carry out this 
exercise throughout the country. With a full-
time staff of fewer than sixty employees, the 
Electoral Commission alone cannot prepare 
rolls for 89 open electorates. The Commission 
must necessarily rely on the assistance and 
input of others, especially public servants in 
the provinces. It must rely on the services of 
others, outside of the public service. The risks 
of tampering with the electoral roll remain. 
It is in this context that every Papua New 
Guinean must realize the cost of behaviour that 
is designed to corrupt the electoral process. We 
and our children will suffer the consequences 
of allowing dishonesty in the process. 
The electoral commissioner is aiming to 
have the preliminary rolls for electorates in 
the highlands issued during the third quarter 
of 2006. Preliminary rolls for other electorates 
will be issued progressively as they become 
available. This will enable the public to have 
sufficient time to check the rolls and allow 
for final improvements to be made to the new 
rolls. Questions have been raised about some 
eligible voters not having been enrolled. There 
is still an opportunity to be enrolled after the 
preliminary rolls are issued. 
In the general election of 2002, because of 
the late release of funding and other logistical 
problems, preliminary rolls were sent out 
late – only a matter of weeks before writs 
for commencement of elections were issued 
– and many complaints were raised because 
of this. Indeed, the Morauta government 
brought court proceedings against the Electoral 
Commission to delay the elections for a few 
weeks because the preliminary rolls were issued 
late. Preliminary rolls are to be released early to 
avoid a similar situation. 
Security issues at polling and 
counting 
In the general election of 2002, major 
security problems led the Electoral Commission 
to declare failed elections in six electorates 
in the Southern Highlands Province. The 
electorates concerned were Kagua-Erave Open, 
Tari Open, Komo-Magarima Open, Imbonggu 
Open, Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open and 
not get anywhere. It will remain behind or 
go backwards with rapid population growth. 
Mothers and children are dying in their 
thousands every year from preventable diseases 
like malaria and TB. 
We must elect individuals to the parliament 
who will manage Papua New Guinea’s limited 
resources wisely. We must elect into parliament 
individuals who see the improvement in the 
wellbeing and progress of the mothers and 
children in the most remote rural areas and 
urban settlements not only as a benefit to 
the mass of people but also to the individual 
MPs themselves and their families, because 
individuals who contribute to the wealth and 
wellbeing of a community that they are part of 
contribute to the wellbeing of themselves and 
their families. 
Electing good individuals to parliament 
is critical for the weak and poor in rural areas 
and urban settlements. An election is not a 
game without consequences, in which it does 
not matter if we allow a few to cheat and 
not do anything about it. Elections have real 
consequences for us all. Elections produce 
MPs. MPs go into parliament and some go into 
the government. Governments decide on how 
public money is spent, and generally decide 
how the country is run. The national budget 
now runs into billions. Who do we want to 
make decisions on how this money is spent? 
We want individuals who are upright, 
honest and of the highest integrity. We do not 
want individuals who cheat in the electoral 
process to control public funds and run the 
affairs of the country. If individuals cheat in 
the electoral process to get into parliament, 
what assurance is there that they will not cheat 
when in control of public monies? 
Elections determine whether we provide a 
good standard of education for all our children 
in both urban and rural areas. Elections 
determine whether mothers and children in 
rural areas get the most basic medical services. 
Elections determine whether we have good 
doctors working in hospitals and medicine to 
cure the diseases that are taking the lives of the 
weak and poor throughout Papua New Guinea. 
If cheating in the election process – whether 
in electoral roll preparation or at other stages 
– is not discouraged and stopped, our people, 
especially the weak and poor, will continue to 
suffer. 
Andrew Trawen, the Electoral 
Commissioner, has announced that past 
electoral rolls are being abandoned, and 
that new rolls will be created for electorates 
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Southern Highlands Provincial. In the history 
of elections in Papua New Guinea, this is the 
first time that a number of elections was failed 
for a common reason. 
In other electorates in Southern Highlands 
Province and Enga Province similar 
disturbances were experienced in the elections, 
especially during polling. Some of these might 
be summarized to remind us that the situations 
were created not by the Electoral Commission 
and its officials but by candidates and their 
supporters. 
• In Imbonggu Open electorate, 84 
ballot boxes were issued for polling, with 
over 80,000 ballot papers. Of these, 32 
ballot boxes destined for Lower Mendi 
LLG were returned by some candidates 
and their supporters with ballot papers 
cast. Polling for these ballot boxes was 
not supervised by electoral officials or 
police, and the ballot papers in them 
could not be counted because none 
could be verified by officials as legitimate 
votes. 
Similarly, 22 ballot boxes and ballot 
papers destined for lalibu Basin were 
returned by candidates and supporters 
without electoral officials or police 
involvement. They could not be counted 
either. 
Two batches of ballot boxes, one with 
16 boxes and the other with 7, were 
returned by electoral officials and police. 
These 23 ballot boxes were the only 
ones that could be accepted out of the 
84 boxes issued. The whereabouts of 
the other ballot boxes was not known. 
Ballot boxes and ballot papers had 
been hijacked by candidates and their 
supporters on the way to polling. 
Given that only 23 ballot boxes were 
available, the outcome in that electorate 
could not be decided and the Electoral 
Commission had no option but to fail 
the election. 
• In Komo-Magarima Open, 101 
ballot boxes were issued with over 90,000 
ballot papers. These were airlifted to the 
five sub-district centres a few days before 
polling and dispatched from the sub-
district centres to polling places. Polling 
did not go well in the electorate; reports 
indicated that there was widespread 
intimidation with the presence of firearms. 
There were even reports of ballot papers 
being marked by a few individuals and 
put into ballot boxes. Some ballot boxes 
were destroyed. For example, five ballot 
boxes from Hulia were brought back by 
polling officials and left at the Tari police 
station. Individuals broke into the police 
station and removed and destroyed the 
ballot boxes and the ballot papers they 
contained. 
Only nineteen policemen were assigned 
to the whole of Komo-Magarima 
electorate. They were unarmed There 
was no way that nineteen unarmed 
policemen could cover the electorate, 
and candidates and their supporters were 
left free to hijack the election. 
The Electoral Commission had little 
option but to fail that election: there 
was no point in the Commission going 
to look for the missing ballot boxes and 
counting them to determine a wining 
candidate. 
• In Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open 
ballot boxes and ballot papers were 
hijacked by candidates and supporters 
even before they reached the polling 
areas. Tribesmen supporting different 
candidates blocked off roads into and 
out of many parts of the electorate. 
Helicopter companies refused to fly 
their aircraft into electorates to drop off 
electoral materials because they feared 
for the safety of their helicopters and 
pilots. In fact, helicopters were reportedly 
shot at by gunmen. Candidates and their 
supporters took the ballot boxes and 
some were polled. Reports were received 
that ballot boxes with cast ballot papers 
were available in some LLG centres but 
their integrity could not be accepted. 
It was reported that ballot papers were 
being sold by individuals. 
Again, the Electoral Commission refused 
to proceed with scrutiny of votes and 
cancelled that election. 
• Problems similar to those in 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago were reported in 
Kagua-Erave Open. A total of 90 ballot 
boxes and over 55,000 ballot papers were 
issued for elections in four LLG areas 
– Erave, Kware, Aiya and Kagua. 
Some 22 ballot boxes and 13,156 ballot 
papers were allocated for Erave LLG. 
But at the Erave station, the assistant 
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returning officer was stabbed and all the 
ballot boxes and ballot papers were taken 
by candidates and their supporters. 
A total of 32 ballot boxes was issued to 
Kagua LLG, of which 20 were for polling 
around Kagua station. Four ballot boxes 
were stolen, one was destroyed at the 
polling place, and 15 were taken by 
candidates and their supporters at polling 
locations. The remaining 12 ballot boxes 
were retained to be airlifted to outlying 
areas of Kagua LLG. On the morning 
of Sunday 7 July 2002, supporters 
of a candidate grabbed two ballot 
boxes, arguing that ballot boxes and 
ballot papers destined for their polling 
places had been taken by others. The 
supporters of another candidate came in 
big numbers to the Tari station and took 
ten ballot boxes and ballot papers. There 
were eight policemen at Kagua station at 
the time who could not do much against 
many tribesmen with firearms. 
Some seven ballot boxes and 2,534 ballot 
papers were destined for Kware LLG area. 
A helicopter commenced airlifting these 
materials to polling places, but after four 
trips the helicopter pilot was threatened 
with injury to his person and the aircraft. 
The helicopter company refused to allow 
further use of its equipment. 
For Aiya LLG, 29 ballot boxes had been 
allocated, with 18,100 ballot papers. 
Because of the helicopter company’s 
refusal to allow the use of its equipment 
and personnel, these ballot boxes could 
not be taken to the polling areas. Four 
candidates decided to ‘assist’ by offering 
to take the materials to the polling 
places, as there were only two vehicles 
available to the electoral officials. The 
returning officer dispatched the materials 
with polling officials to go to the polling 
places. However, on the way, the four 
candidates and their supporters argued 
amongst themselves and fought over the 
ballot boxes and ballot papers, which 
were never seen again. 
Other ballot boxes and ballot papers were 
unaccounted for. Again, the Electoral 
Commission was forced to cancel the 
election. 
• In Tari Open, ballot boxes and 
ballot papers were properly dispatched 
for polling, accompanied by polling 
officials. Some ballot boxes were properly 
returned, including nine boxes used for 
polling around Tari station. A number 
of ballot boxes and ballot papers were 
destroyed at polling places, however. 
Whilst over 40 ballot boxes with cast 
ballot papers were returned to Tari 
station, this represented something over 
half of the ballot boxes issued. 
On 9 July 2002, all ballot boxes with 
cast ballot papers at the Tari station 
were looted and damaged by two rival 
candidates and their supporters. The 
40-odd ballot boxes were taken away 
and never seen again. This was done in 
the presence of 15 local policemen and 
a mobile squad of 20 policemen. The 
two rival groups fought in Tari station, 
resulting in two deaths. The policemen 
could not stop the looting, destruction 
and killing because the rival clans were 
armed with high-powered firearms. 
Once again, with over half of the ballot 
boxes and ballot papers destroyed or not 
located, the Electoral Commission had 
no option but to fail that election too. 
• The election for the Southern 
Highlands Provincial electorate was 
cancelled because the problems in the 
open electorates affected the provincial 
electorate. Ballot papers for the provincial 
electorate were destroyed, damaged or 
did not surface for other reasons as well. 
Problems were also encountered in other 
electorates, but were not serious enough to 
result in cancellation of elections. 
• In the Wapenamanda Open 
electorate in Enga, two ballot boxes 
containing cast ballot papers were 
destroyed at polling places by disgruntled 
supporters. 
• In Kompiam-Ambum Open, seven 
ballot boxes waiting to be airlifted to 
polling areas were hijacked by candidates 
and their supporters at Wabag. Two 
ballot boxes were separately hijacked at 
another location, and were destroyed. 
They were subsequently the subject of a 
major court dispute. 
• In Wabag Open, nine ballot boxes 
with cast ballot papers were destroyed by 
fire when a shipping container containing 
cast ballot boxes from a number of open 
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electorates in Enga Province was fire 
bombed at the Wabag police station. 
• In Laigaip-Porgera Open, two 
ballot boxes were destroyed by the fire 
at the Wabag Station whilst eight ballot 
boxes were hijacked. 
• In Kandep Open, fifteen ballot 
boxes were destroyed by the fire at the 
Wabag police station, destroying over 
7,000 cast votes. 
The incident at the Wabag police station 
was one of the most serious experienced. Ballot 
boxes from a number of open electorates were 
brought into the police station with cast ballot 
papers. These were put into containers to be 
kept safe for counting. The containers were 
placed in front of the Wabag police station. 
On the night of 10 July, men armed with high-
powered firearms, including a submachine gun, 
held up the lone policeman on night duty, shot 
open the locks to one of the containers and 
firebombed the contents, destroying 26 ballot 
boxes and cast ballot papers. Fortunately, the 
26 ballot boxes were distributed between 3 
electorates – Wabag (9), Lagaip- Porgera (2), 
and Kandep 15 – and the remaining ballot 
boxes could still be counted. 
Another serious incident occurred in 
Wabag, where an assistant returning officer’s 
wife was shot dead in election-related violence 
when gunmen went to the officer’s house 
looking for him. There were other incidents 
where polling officers and returning officers 
were kidnapped and later released. An assistant 
returning officer appointed to take charge of 
elections in Kware LLG in Kagua-Erave Open 
resigned his position close to the day of polling 
because a candidate’s tribesmen threatened 
him and said that they would declare war on 
his tribe. 
Counting of votes for the remaining 
electorates in Southern Highlands was done in 
Mount Hagen. Mendi was unsafe for anyone 
to count votes. This created major logistical 
problems for the Electoral Commission and 
police. Ballot boxes had to be brought to 
Mount Hagen, and polling officials from these 
electorates were required to travel to Mount 
Hagen. Some did, but many did not. Because of 
this, some counting rules were not followed. 
election timetable and the 
formation of government 
On the recommendation of the Electoral 
Commissioner, on 4 April 2002 the head of 
state set the following timetable for the return 
of writs for the general election: 
Nomination open, 11 April 2002 
Commencement of polling, 15 June 2002 
Last day of polling, 29 June 2002 
Return of writs, 15 July 2002. 
Nominations commenced as scheduled. 
Polling commenced in all parts of the 
country as scheduled except in the following 
electorates: Lae Open; part of Wewak Open 
(Wewak Urban); all electorates in NCD; and 
all electorates in the five highlands provinces. 
Polling for the latter electorates was 
scheduled for one-day polling. One-day polling 
in these electorates proceeded as scheduled 
except in Southern Highlands and Enga. 
Polling for Enga and Southern Highlands was 
scheduled for 25 June, but due to bad weather 
conditions electoral officials and police, 
together with polling materials, could not be 
dispatched to the polling locations. At the 
request of polling officials and at the written 
request of then commissioner of police, Joseph 
Kupo (letter to the electoral commissioner 
dated 25 June 2002), polling was deferred and 
set to end on 10 July. 
Using limited powers given to the electoral 
commissioner, the polling timetable was 
changed mid-stream by deferring the last day of 
polling from 29 June to 10 July. With the date 
set for return of writs being 15 July, this gave 
very little time for the Electoral Commission to 
count votes in Enga and Southern Highlands 
electorates. In fact, vote counting could not be 
completed within the five days available. 
The Commission then turned to Section 
177 of the Organic Law on National and Local-
level Government Elections, which permitted the 
Commission to change the polling date. But, 
with respect to the date for return of writs, the 
original date could be changed by an extension 
of no more than fourteen days. On the advice 
of the electoral commissioner, the head of 
state extended the writ return date from the 
originally scheduled date of 15 July to 29 July. 
Beyond this, the Commission had no powers to 
extend the date. 
Essentially, by law (s.105 of the constitution) 
the timetable for an election is set within 
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a period of three months before the fifth 
anniversary of the previous general election. 
This is because all MPs have a five-year term, 
which ends on the fifth anniversary of their 
becoming MPs. They become MPs on the date 
that their writs are returned. 
The Electoral Commission has to commence 
and conclude a general election within the 
three months period. In the case of the general 
election of 2002, because of the problems and 
consequent delays, elections went outside the 
three-month period. 
Counting of votes for the electorates in 
Southern Highlands Province that were not 
cancelled was seriously delayed because ballot 
boxes were flown to Mount Hagen. There were 
disputes over this move. Time was also taken 
in bringing in polling officials to participate in 
counting. Counting officials then demanded 
to be paid allowances before they would 
participate in counting. Some policemen did 
likewise. Counting was delayed considerably. 
For electorates in Enga Province, counting 
did not start on time because rumours were 
being spread there that all elections would 
be cancelled. In addition, counting officials 
refused to participate pending claims for 
advance payment of allowances. This was a 
problem experienced in counting throughout 
the five highlands provinces. 
Writs from Enga Province were eventually 
returned on the evening of 29 July – the 
last day. In fact, the Electoral Commission 
delayed returning writs to the head of state 
until 10:00pm in the evening of 29 July, to 
enable the last writs from Enga and Southern 
Highlands provinces to reach him. However, a 
few writs were very late and were not returned 
until the next day, 30 July. Complaints were 
made in the court of disputed returns about the 
late return of writs. 
Writs for most electorates in the highlands 
were returned after the original date set for 
return of writs, 15 July. Because of this, the 
leader of the National Alliance party, Sir 
Michael Somare, threatened court action to 
prevent the writs outstanding after 15 July from 
being accepted. 
This objection was subsequently dropped. 
However, the attorney-general filed an action 
against the Electoral Commission in the 
Supreme Court, and asked the Supreme Court 
to declare failed elections in all the Southern 
Highlands and Enga provinces because these 
elections were affected by widespread violence, 
intimidation, and so on, and were not proper 
elections. Complaint was also made in this 
court action that the election timetable had 
not been complied with and that constitutional 
prescriptions were breached. This court action 
added to the confusion that surrounded the 
general election of 2002. 
In this environment, the electoral 
commissioner was required by the Organic Law 
on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates 
to advise the head of state on which political 
party had returned the greatest number of 
candidates so that it could be invited to form 
government. This is an important power given 
to the electoral commissioner. 
Between 29 July and 4 August 2002, the 
electoral commissioner was required to perform 
two important constitutional functions: first, he 
was to recommend to the head of state which 
elections in the Southern Highlands and Enga 
provinces should be failed; secondly, he was to 
recommend to the head of state which political 
party should be invited to form government. 
Ultimately, the decisions made by the 
then electoral commissioner, Rueben Kaiulo, 
following the 2002 general election – namely, 
the failing of six elections in the Southern 
Highlands and the advice to the head of state 
that the National Alliance party should be 
invited to form government –were not seriously 
questioned.
The reforms
At the beginning of 2003, Andrew Trawen, 
the newly appointed electoral commissioner, 
appointed a three-man team to review the 
electoral laws in the light of issues raised in 
the general election of 2002 but also to look 
at other matters, including electoral roll 
management. This team comprised Morea 
Veri, deputy electoral commissioner, Soki Raga, 
director, Policy and Planning, and myself. 
We reviewed a number of reports, including 
reports by the Commonwealth Observer 
Group on the general election of 2002, and a 
detailed report by AusAID. We investigated 
the problems faced, drawing on our own 
experiences. We submitted our report to 
Commissioner Trawen in December 2004. The 
report recommended review of the election 
laws with the aim of updating them. We 
recommended a timetable to be adopted for 
this; in essence, we suggested that the changes 
be enacted by December 2005, with 2006 being 
used to publicize the substance of the changes 
before commencement of the general election 
in 2007. 
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The electoral commissioner acted on the 
recommendations and commissioned the same 
team to work on the changes. These were 
taken, with the required approvals, to the 
National Executive Council. The National 
Executive Council approved most of the 
recommendations, and the first vote on the 
proposed changes was successfully taken in 
the last sitting of the National Parliament at 
the end of April. The second and last vote is 
expected in the next sitting of parliament, in 
June 2006. 
What are the proposed changes? The 
changes proposed address the two areas 
highlighted at the beginning of this paper: one, 
to deal with some of the problems experienced 
in the general election of 2002; the other, to 
change certain aspects of the laws to suit Papua 
New Guinea’s circumstances. The changes are 
summarized below in relation to the problems 
highlighted. 
The electoral roll 
People must take ownership of electoral 
rolls. Laws cannot prevent people from 
corrupting the electoral roll. If there is 
concerted action on the part of the population 
to corrupt a roll, there is nothing much that 
the Electoral Commission can do to prevent 
this. That is the reason why, we, the people, 
have to realize the consequences of our actions. 
Corrupting electoral processes leads to corrupt 
MPs, which results in poor services for us all. 
Certain aspects of the election laws also 
prevent electoral rolls from being managed 
properly, especially to remove suspect names. 
One such aspect is the objection process. 
Under the law as it currently stands, a name 
on a roll cannot be removed unless a strict 
objection process is observed. If this process is 
not complied with, an election can invalidated. 
The Electoral Commission can also be sued for 
damages, as has happened already. 
The objection process requires that before a 
name that is on a roll can be removed, someone 
must first object to the name remaining on the 
roll. This is the action that begins the process. 
A fee of K4 must be paid for each objection. 
A returning officer can register such objection 
too. An objection made by a returning officer 
does not require the payment of the fee. 
The next stage is for the objection to be 
sent in the form of a letter forwarded to the 
last known place of residence of the person 
whose name is objected to. The letter proposes 
that the name will be removed from the roll. 
The person must then give an answer to the 
objection, and the returning officer must 
make a decision on it. If a person is dissatisfied 
with the decision of the returning officer, the 
decision can be appealed to the District Court. 
These provisions are taken directly from 
Australian legislation. They worked well in 
Australia, where most people have addresses 
and letters to individuals can be delivered to 
their doorsteps through an efficient postal 
system. In Papua New Guinea, the large 
rural-based population does not have postal 
addresses. In urban areas, it is not possible to 
deliver objections to settlements. It is difficult 
to get a letter to an individual in a village from 
a provincial, district or sub-district centre let 
alone getting hundreds or thousands of letters 
to individuals whose names should be removed 
from electoral rolls. This has made it difficult 
to remove names from rolls. 
The objection process is the only lawful 
way to remove names from rolls. If names are 
removed without following this procedure, this 
can result in elections being invalidated, as 
happened in the case of an election in Wabag 
Open in 1997. In that case, the name of the 
successful candidate, Takal Kapi, which was 
on the 1992 Wabag Open electoral roll, was 
removed without following the objections 
procedure. His name was not included the 1997 
roll. Kapi nominated to contest the election in 
1997 and won, but it was later discovered that 
his name was not listed in the 1997 electorate 
roll. A petition filed against his election, based 
on the absence of his name from the roll, was 
successful; his election was voided and a by-
election was ordered. Subsequent to this, Kapi 
sued the Electoral Commission, alleging that 
his name was on the 1992 electoral roll but 
was unlawfully removed for the 1997 roll. He 
argued that his name was removed without 
following the objections procedure, and the 
National Court decided in his favour. 
It is proposed to change this part of the 
law in two respects. First, instead of sending 
letters to individual persons at the last known 
place of residence, a returning officer can send 
a list of names to a village elder, councillor or 
church elder to bring to the notice of persons 
concerned. Answers may then be forwarded 
either by the persons concerned or by the 
councillor or other village elder. Secondly, by 
gazettal notice the Electoral Commission can 
create new rolls with ease. In such cases, the 
new rolls will not relate to previous rolls but will 
be completely new rolls. Under the current law, 
this is possible only in very limited situations. 
 Two Papers on Electoral Reform in Papua New Guinea
13
Security at polling and counting 
Security issues faced in electorates in 
the highlands cannot be tackled by making 
changes to laws. Meaningful solutions can 
only come through behavioural change. This 
will take time, but the pace of change can be 
advanced if people are made aware early that 
the cost of disrupting elections affects us all on 
a daily basis. 
If elections are disrupted and not held 
properly, the individuals elected will not 
genuinely represent the people and will not be 
accountable to the majority. They will not make 
good decisions about the use of public funds. 
The end result is that everyone suffers through 
poor educational services for our children, poor 
health services resulting in deaths of women 
and children in their thousands every year from 
preventable diseases, poor infrastructure, and 
poor management of the nation’s resources. It 
is therefore in everyone’s interest to ensure that 
elections are clean, so that those elected feel 
a real responsibility (and hence accountability) 
to their voters. 
In the proposed reforms, some incentives 
and disincentives are introduced to discourage 
disruptive and negative behaviour in elections 
and encourage cooperative behaviour. 
• The limited preferential voting 
(LPV) system introduced in 2002 will 
allow for cooperative behaviour between 
candidates and supporters, replacing the 
combative behaviour associated with 
first-past-the-post voting. 
• The format and size of ballot 
papers will be changed, to make ballot 
papers simpler and smaller. This will 
enable smaller ballot boxes to be used 
for polling, allowing electoral materials 
before and after polling to be handled 
with ease, requiring less manpower and 
funds to fly materials to and from remote 
parts of the country in helicopters and 
airplanes. 
• The Electoral Commission will be 
empowered to withdraw writs issued for 
elections in particular electorates where 
widespread problems are likely to arise 
that will make it impossible to conduct a 
decent election. In the general election 
of 2002, it was known before polling 
commenced that proper polling was not 
going to occur in some of the electorates 
in the Southern Highlands Province. 
Intelligence reports indicated that there 
was a build-up of firearms in certain 
electorates and that there were already 
tensions waiting to spill over. Despite 
these warning signs, the Electoral 
Commission proceeded with elections in 
these electorates, spending hundreds of 
thousands of kina and risking the safety 
of electoral officials, because there was 
no power in the Electoral Commission 
to withdraw or cancel an election. The 
proposals now being made give authority 
to the Electoral Commission to withdraw 
a writ. However, this power is not to 
be used by just one person; a group of 
three people from outside will advise 
the electoral commissioner on whether 
or not a writ for an election should be 
withdrawn. 
• The Electoral Commission will also 
be empowered to prosecute individuals 
for breaches of electoral laws. Persons 
found guilty may face various penalties 
including disqualification from contesting 
or holding elective public office. 
Election timetable and the formation of 
government 
The proposed changes impact on the 
election timetable and the procedures following 
a general election leading to formation of 
government. Some of these will contribute to 
easing tensions in elections and avoid security 
problems resulting in disrupted elections. 
•	 More flexibility is given to the 
Electoral Commission to adjust the 
election timetable if problems are 
experienced during the election process. 
The Commission has flexibility to 
change polling schedules, polling 
commencement and completion dates as 
well as writ return dates. However, this 
flexibility is provided within the three-
month period set by the constitution. 
• In the context of flexibility on 
election administration timetable, the 
Electoral Commission is allowed the 
flexibility to stagger elections if this 
is considered necessary to deal with 
security-related issues. Elections may be 
staggered within a province or within an 
electorate. 
• Similarly, the Electoral Commission 
is given flexibility to schedule national 
elections and local-level government 
(LLG) elections according to each 
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individual situation in each electorate. 
In the experience of the general election 
of 2002, LLG elections were conducted 
efficiently and combined well with 
national elections in some electorates. 
In other electorates, LLG elections 
created problems for national elections 
resulting in both elections being badly 
affected, notably when conflicts between 
candidates in LLG elections spilled over 
to national elections. The proposed 
changes leave the discretion as to when 
to hold national and LLG elections to 
the Commission, unlike the present 
situation where the Commission must 
hold both elections together. With the 
proposed changes, the Commission may 
schedule LLG elections together with 
national elections in electorates where 
this is easy to do, as this is less costly, 
but where LLG elections are likely to 
create problems for national elections, 
the Electoral Commission can schedule 
LLG elections before or after national 
elections. 
The types of problems experienced in the 
general election of 2002 that related to the 
strict time limits placed by the organic law will 
not arise again if these proposed changes are 
enacted. 
The procedures for the electoral 
commissioner to advise the head of state to 
invite a political party to form government 
after a general election are clarified and made 
transparent by the proposed changes. This is 
done by requiring the electoral commissioner 
to set out in his advice the number of political 
parties that contested the elections, details of 
candidates returned by each political party, 
and the number of independents elected, and 
then advise the head of state on the political 
party that has returned the largest number of 
candidates. This advice is to be made available 
to the public at the same time. At present, there 
is no form of advice required and advice could 
be given by a letter simply naming a political 
party without giving other details. 
other changes 
There are other small but important 
changes included to improve general election 
administration and management. For example, 
an amendment is proposed to the provisions 
of the organic law to change the nomination 
procedure and format relating to political 
party endorsements. At present, the law does 
not stop a candidate from nominating first 
and then changing his/her political party 
position. This created many problems for 
the Electoral Commission in the general 
election of 2002. Some candidates obtained 
endorsement from one political party first and 
nominated accordingly, only to later accept 
nomination from another political party. Some 
political parties nominated one candidate but 
subsequently nominated another candidate 
in the same electorate. Such practices created 
confusion for voters. In addition, the Electoral 
Commission could not print ballot papers 
without determining the status of political 
party endorsements for a good number of 
candidates. Some candidates had three separate 
nominations endorsed by three different 
political parties. One of the proposed changes 
says that once a candidate has been endorsed 
by a political party, he/she is not allowed to 
change the endorsement. 
concluding remarks 
A number of points may be made in 
conclusion. 
•	 Laws do not themselves solve 
problems. Laws are tools to be used by 
people to solve problems or influence 
behaviour for favoured outcomes. 
Therefore, the legal reforms to the 
electoral system proposed, and those 
made already (such as the LPV voting 
system), are instruments to be used by 
us, the people, to achieve our desired 
objectives. Laws, by themselves, do not 
achieve anything. People do. 
• Elections are not games. Elections 
have real consequences on people. The 
outcomes of elections affect all of us in 
our daily lives. The people we choose in 
elections determine whether we have 
schools, resourced and staffed by good 
people, to give a decent education to 
our children. The people we choose in 
elections determine whether there are 
aid posts in rural areas, good doctors in 
hospitals, and medicines in hospitals 
and aid posts to prevent people from 
dying from preventable diseases. We 
must see the direct connection between 
our vote, a good electoral system, and 
the poor services that we continue to 
receive. Elections are not simply about 
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democracy, a concept that we do not 
readily grasp. 
• In this context, we the people 
must own elections. A vote that is 
guaranteed by the constitution is a civil 
right and is valuable. But to most Papua 
New Guineans, the vote is not seen as 
valuable unless a connection is made 
between their vote and the services that 
are received (or not received). We must 
make that connection and continuously 
remind ourselves of it. 
• The electoral process is the only 
means whereby every individual of 
voting age gets to have a say on how 
public resources are managed and how 
the country is run. Once every five years 
MPs have to account to us, the people, 
for what they have done with the trust 
bestowed on them. It is in all our best 
interests to own the elections and ensure 
that elections take place peacefully, fairly 
and in legitimate ways. 
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